What is this telling us? German growth hasn’t been great, one quarter notwithstanding; but it avoided US-style mass layoffs even when it was slumping badly. Part of the explanation is the Kurzarbeit program of work-sharing; also, Germany’s labor laws and its strong unions have led to a situation in which workers aren’t treated as much as variable costs as they are here.
So American conservatives now holding up Germany as a role model are actually praising the virtues of Eurosclerosis, and disparaging American-style capitalism.
2010 m. rugsėjo 2 d., ketvirtadienis
Paul Krugman apie JAV vs. Vokietijos nedarbą
Paradoksas:
Skolos defliacija paprastai
Paul Krugman: Inflation, Deflation, Debt
September 2, 2010, 2:53 pm
Some readers ask what’s actually a very good question: even granted that inflation reduces the real liabilities of debtors, it also reduces the real assets of creditors. So why is there any benefit to the economy?
The answer is, I think, easier to understand by considering the reverse case: the problem of debt-deflation. Here a falling price level increases the real value of all debts — and Irving Fisher famously argued that this has a contractionary effect on the economy, possibly turning into a vicious circle. Why?
The answer is that on average, debtors are more likely to be constrained by their balance sheets than creditors. The 1929-33 plunge in prices made heavily mortgaged farmers poorer, while making wealthy people sitting on cash richer; but while the farmers were forced to slash spending to make their payments, the people sitting on cash merely had the option of spending more — an option many didn’t take. Or, to lapse into economese, the marginal propensity to spend out of wealth is surely higher for debtors than for creditors, so the redistribution of real wealth caused by deflation is contractionary. And conversely, redistribution through inflation raises overall demand.
And all of this in turn explains why debt, even if it’s debt we collectively owe to ourselves, can be a major economic problem.
September 2, 2010, 2:53 pm
Some readers ask what’s actually a very good question: even granted that inflation reduces the real liabilities of debtors, it also reduces the real assets of creditors. So why is there any benefit to the economy?
The answer is, I think, easier to understand by considering the reverse case: the problem of debt-deflation. Here a falling price level increases the real value of all debts — and Irving Fisher famously argued that this has a contractionary effect on the economy, possibly turning into a vicious circle. Why?
The answer is that on average, debtors are more likely to be constrained by their balance sheets than creditors. The 1929-33 plunge in prices made heavily mortgaged farmers poorer, while making wealthy people sitting on cash richer; but while the farmers were forced to slash spending to make their payments, the people sitting on cash merely had the option of spending more — an option many didn’t take. Or, to lapse into economese, the marginal propensity to spend out of wealth is surely higher for debtors than for creditors, so the redistribution of real wealth caused by deflation is contractionary. And conversely, redistribution through inflation raises overall demand.
And all of this in turn explains why debt, even if it’s debt we collectively owe to ourselves, can be a major economic problem.
Pinigai už senus laužus
‘Clunkers,’ a classic government folly
By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Columnist September 1, 2010
IN THE market for a used car? Good luck finding a bargain: The price of “pre-owned’’ vehicles has climbed considerably over the past year. According to Edmunds.com, a website for car buyers, a three-year-old automobile today will set you back, on average, close to $20,000 — a spike of more than 10 percent since last summer. For some popular models, the increase has been much steeper. In July, a used Cadillac Escalade was going for around $35,000, or nearly 36 percent over last July’s price.
Why are used-car prices rocketing? Part of the answer is that demand is up: With unemployment high and the economy uncertain, some car buyers who might otherwise be looking for a new truck or SUV are instead shopping for a used vehicle as a way to save money.
But an even bigger part of the answer is that the supply of used cars is artificially low, because your Uncle Sam decided last year to destroy hundreds of thousands of perfectly good automobiles as part of its hare-brained Car Allowance Rebate System — or, as most of us called it, Cash for Clunkers. That was the program under which the government paid consumers up to $4,500 when they traded in an old car and bought a new one with better gas mileage. The traded-in cars — which had to be in drivable condition to qualify for the rebate — were then demolished: Dealers were required to chemically wreck each car’s engine, and send the car to be crushed or shredded.
Congress and the Obama administration trumpeted Cash for Clunkers as a triumph — the president pronounced it “successful beyond anybody’s imagination.’’ Which it was, if you define success as getting people to take “free’’ money to make a purchase most of them are going to make anyway, while simultaneously wiping out productive assets that could provide value to many other consumers for years to come. By any rational standard, however, this program was sheer folly.
No great insight was needed to realize that Cash for Clunkers would work a hardship on people unable to afford a new car. “All this program did for them,’’ I wrote last August, “was guarantee that used cars will become more expensive. Poorer drivers will be penalized to subsidize new cars for wealthier drivers.’’ Alec Gutierrez, a senior analyst for Kelley Blue Book, predicted that used-car prices would surge by up to 10 percent. “It’s going to drive prices up on some of the most affordable vehicles we have on the road,’’ he told USA Today. In short, Washington spent nearly $3 billion to raise the price of mobility for drivers on a budget.
To be sure, Cash for Clunkers gave a powerful jolt to car sales in July and August of 2009. But it did so mostly by delaying sales that would otherwise have occurred in April, May, and June, or by accelerating those that would have taken place in September, October, or later. “Influencing the timing of consumers’ durable purchases is easy,’’ Edmunds CEO Jeremy Anwyl wrote a few days ago in a blog post looking back at the program. “Creating new purchases is not.’’ Of the 700,000 cars purchased during the clunkers frenzy, the estimated net increase in sales was only 125,000. Each incremental sale thus ended up costing the taxpayers a profligate $24,000.
Even on environmental grounds, Cash for Clunkers was an exorbitant dud. Researchers at the University of California-Davis calculated that the reduction of carbon dioxide attributable to the program cost no less than $237 per ton. In contrast, carbon emissions credits cost about $20 per ton in international markets.
Using Department of Transportation figures, the Associated Press calculated that replacing inefficient clunkers with new cars getting higher mileage would reduce CO2 emissions by around 700,000 tons a year — less than Americans emit in a single hour. Likewise, the projected reduction in gasoline use amounted to about as much as Americans go through in 4 hours. (And that’s only if you assume — contrary to historical experience — that fuel consumption decreases when fuel efficiency rises.)
When all is said and done, Cash for Clunkers was a deplorable exercise in budgetary wastefulness, asset destruction, environmental irrelevance, and economic idiocy. Other than that, it was a screaming success.
By Jeff Jacoby, Globe Columnist September 1, 2010
IN THE market for a used car? Good luck finding a bargain: The price of “pre-owned’’ vehicles has climbed considerably over the past year. According to Edmunds.com, a website for car buyers, a three-year-old automobile today will set you back, on average, close to $20,000 — a spike of more than 10 percent since last summer. For some popular models, the increase has been much steeper. In July, a used Cadillac Escalade was going for around $35,000, or nearly 36 percent over last July’s price.
Why are used-car prices rocketing? Part of the answer is that demand is up: With unemployment high and the economy uncertain, some car buyers who might otherwise be looking for a new truck or SUV are instead shopping for a used vehicle as a way to save money.
But an even bigger part of the answer is that the supply of used cars is artificially low, because your Uncle Sam decided last year to destroy hundreds of thousands of perfectly good automobiles as part of its hare-brained Car Allowance Rebate System — or, as most of us called it, Cash for Clunkers. That was the program under which the government paid consumers up to $4,500 when they traded in an old car and bought a new one with better gas mileage. The traded-in cars — which had to be in drivable condition to qualify for the rebate — were then demolished: Dealers were required to chemically wreck each car’s engine, and send the car to be crushed or shredded.
Congress and the Obama administration trumpeted Cash for Clunkers as a triumph — the president pronounced it “successful beyond anybody’s imagination.’’ Which it was, if you define success as getting people to take “free’’ money to make a purchase most of them are going to make anyway, while simultaneously wiping out productive assets that could provide value to many other consumers for years to come. By any rational standard, however, this program was sheer folly.
No great insight was needed to realize that Cash for Clunkers would work a hardship on people unable to afford a new car. “All this program did for them,’’ I wrote last August, “was guarantee that used cars will become more expensive. Poorer drivers will be penalized to subsidize new cars for wealthier drivers.’’ Alec Gutierrez, a senior analyst for Kelley Blue Book, predicted that used-car prices would surge by up to 10 percent. “It’s going to drive prices up on some of the most affordable vehicles we have on the road,’’ he told USA Today. In short, Washington spent nearly $3 billion to raise the price of mobility for drivers on a budget.
To be sure, Cash for Clunkers gave a powerful jolt to car sales in July and August of 2009. But it did so mostly by delaying sales that would otherwise have occurred in April, May, and June, or by accelerating those that would have taken place in September, October, or later. “Influencing the timing of consumers’ durable purchases is easy,’’ Edmunds CEO Jeremy Anwyl wrote a few days ago in a blog post looking back at the program. “Creating new purchases is not.’’ Of the 700,000 cars purchased during the clunkers frenzy, the estimated net increase in sales was only 125,000. Each incremental sale thus ended up costing the taxpayers a profligate $24,000.
Even on environmental grounds, Cash for Clunkers was an exorbitant dud. Researchers at the University of California-Davis calculated that the reduction of carbon dioxide attributable to the program cost no less than $237 per ton. In contrast, carbon emissions credits cost about $20 per ton in international markets.
Using Department of Transportation figures, the Associated Press calculated that replacing inefficient clunkers with new cars getting higher mileage would reduce CO2 emissions by around 700,000 tons a year — less than Americans emit in a single hour. Likewise, the projected reduction in gasoline use amounted to about as much as Americans go through in 4 hours. (And that’s only if you assume — contrary to historical experience — that fuel consumption decreases when fuel efficiency rises.)
When all is said and done, Cash for Clunkers was a deplorable exercise in budgetary wastefulness, asset destruction, environmental irrelevance, and economic idiocy. Other than that, it was a screaming success.
2010 m. rugsėjo 1 d., trečiadienis
The Economist apie nelygybę ir visuomenės sveikatą
Spirit of the age
Sep 1st 2010, 10:56 by Buttonwood
INEQUALITY is a fascinating subject, with plenty of moral, economic and political implications. So it was remiss of me to take so long to read The "Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone", a thought-provoking book published last year by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett. But at least I have the excuse that the debate is still current: the Policy Exchange thinktank recently published a rebuttal (http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Beware_False_Prophets_Jul_10.pdf) of its claims. My Bagehot colleague has also commented (http://www.economist.com/node/16844516?story_id=16844516) recently on the book.
"The Spirit Level" is really divided into three parts. The first is a statistical analysis of a number of social ills, from obesity through infant mortality to rates of imprisonment. These measures are then compared with income inequality in two ways; first across a range of industrialised countries and then against the individual US states. Time after time, it is shown that inequality makes these matters worse. Indeed, everyone suffers; even the better-off in unequal societies have more social problems than the better-off in more egalitarian ones.
The second part of the book suggests reasons for why the link exists. Here the statistical analysis is more sketchy; the authors cite some studies but a lot more work needs to be done. Broadly speaking, the authors suggest that man is a social animal whose self-respect is tied up with status; inequality has many practical implications (an inability to fund a desired lifestyle, a loss of control) that cause depression, and thus the adoption of bad behaviours such as overeating, drug use and criminality.
The third part of the book deals with the authors' solutions to the problem, which is a bit of a mish-mash of issues like global warming, worker-controlled companies, anti-consumerism and so on.
One can disagree with the authors' solutions but the book stands and falls on the quality of its data; if they are right, then there is a welfare case for much greater government efforts to redistribute wealth. This is where the Policy Exchange report mounts its attack. It states that the effects noted by Wilkinson and Pickett are largely the result of a few outliers (Japan for longevity, the US for murder rates, Scandinavia for most things) and that the relationship does not exist when these outliers are removed. Indeed, it does not exist if more countires are included. When it comes to the individual US states, Policy Exchange argues that the effects can be noted by the proportion of African-Americans within the population. In short, the effect is cultural, not economic.
Sweden and Japan, for example, have the income distributions they have because of the kinds of societies they are. They are not cohesive societies because their incomes are equally distributed; their incomes are equally distributed because they evolved as remarkably cohesive societies.
Wilkinson and Pickett have responded (http://liberalconspiracy.org/2010/07/08/spirit-level-authors-hit-back-at-policy-exchange-report/) to these attacks and there is a danger that we get bogged down in the minutiae of the data, about which outsiders find it difficult to comment.
But it did strike me on reading the book that culture must play a significant part. Read for example what the authors have to say about New England.
Because Vermont and New Hampshire are neighbouring New England states, the contrast between them is particularly striking. Vermont has the highest tax burden of any state in the union, while New Hampshire has the second lowest - beaten only by Alaska. Yet New Hampshire has the best performance of any state in the union on our index of health and social problems and is closely followed by Vermont, which is third best. They both also do well on equality: despite their radically different taxation, they are the fourth and sixth most equal states respectively.
Both states are ethnically quite homogeneous with much lower proportions of minorities (http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/33000.html) than the American average. Sweden and Japan are similar. There is an argument that social spending is seen as more "acceptable" when the recipients are "people like us". An alternative explanation is that ethnic minorities are unfairly excluded from economic opportunities by the majority population so that higher social ills may be associated with more diverse (less monocultural) populations.
A broader issue, to which Wilkinson and Pickett allude, is whether there is a "natural" level of inequality. Anyone who has studied history (or read Austen and Dickens) will note the vast gulf in wealth between the medieval aristocracy and the peasants or between the early industrialists and their workers. In that light, the period of the "Great compression" from the 1940s to the 1970s, when inequality fell sharply, seems an aberration. But our recorded history only spans a few thousand years, generally since the development of agriculture. For much of human existence, men were hunter-gatherers and such societies are much more equal. Wilkinson and Pickett argue that our brains developed in such conditions, explaining why inequality is so difficult to stomach.
As always with this issue, there will be some who think that any sympathetic treatment of the Wilkinson/Pickett arguments is "socialism" or a sign of The Economist abandoning its free market principles. But let me end this very long post with two final reasons why inequality should be a matter of general concern.
The first concerns the idea that we should focus on "equality of opportunity" not "equality of outcome". This seems a good principle to support. But unequal outcomes may lead to unequal opportunities; the US is a lot less socially mobile than it used to be, and a lot less mobile than individual Americans believe it to be. In particular, wealth can buy access to power and thus lock in the advantages of the wealthy via the political system; Simon Johnson's book, "13 Bankers", is an example of the thesis. Wealth also buys access to the best education, and education is the key to employment opportunities in a service-based economy.
The second issue is that the West is still democratic. Even if one thinks the unequal outcome of incomes is a fair reflection of individual talent and effort, the majority of the population is unlikely to feel that way. They may eventually reclaim that wealth by the ballot box, and possibly by electing some very unpleasant regimes.
Sep 1st 2010, 10:56 by Buttonwood
INEQUALITY is a fascinating subject, with plenty of moral, economic and political implications. So it was remiss of me to take so long to read The "Spirit Level: Why Equality is Better for Everyone", a thought-provoking book published last year by Richard Wilkinson and Kate Pickett. But at least I have the excuse that the debate is still current: the Policy Exchange thinktank recently published a rebuttal (http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/pdfs/Beware_False_Prophets_Jul_10.pdf) of its claims. My Bagehot colleague has also commented (http://www.economist.com/node/16844516?story_id=16844516) recently on the book.
"The Spirit Level" is really divided into three parts. The first is a statistical analysis of a number of social ills, from obesity through infant mortality to rates of imprisonment. These measures are then compared with income inequality in two ways; first across a range of industrialised countries and then against the individual US states. Time after time, it is shown that inequality makes these matters worse. Indeed, everyone suffers; even the better-off in unequal societies have more social problems than the better-off in more egalitarian ones.
The second part of the book suggests reasons for why the link exists. Here the statistical analysis is more sketchy; the authors cite some studies but a lot more work needs to be done. Broadly speaking, the authors suggest that man is a social animal whose self-respect is tied up with status; inequality has many practical implications (an inability to fund a desired lifestyle, a loss of control) that cause depression, and thus the adoption of bad behaviours such as overeating, drug use and criminality.
The third part of the book deals with the authors' solutions to the problem, which is a bit of a mish-mash of issues like global warming, worker-controlled companies, anti-consumerism and so on.
One can disagree with the authors' solutions but the book stands and falls on the quality of its data; if they are right, then there is a welfare case for much greater government efforts to redistribute wealth. This is where the Policy Exchange report mounts its attack. It states that the effects noted by Wilkinson and Pickett are largely the result of a few outliers (Japan for longevity, the US for murder rates, Scandinavia for most things) and that the relationship does not exist when these outliers are removed. Indeed, it does not exist if more countires are included. When it comes to the individual US states, Policy Exchange argues that the effects can be noted by the proportion of African-Americans within the population. In short, the effect is cultural, not economic.
Sweden and Japan, for example, have the income distributions they have because of the kinds of societies they are. They are not cohesive societies because their incomes are equally distributed; their incomes are equally distributed because they evolved as remarkably cohesive societies.
Wilkinson and Pickett have responded (http://liberalconspiracy.org/2010/07/08/spirit-level-authors-hit-back-at-policy-exchange-report/) to these attacks and there is a danger that we get bogged down in the minutiae of the data, about which outsiders find it difficult to comment.
But it did strike me on reading the book that culture must play a significant part. Read for example what the authors have to say about New England.
Because Vermont and New Hampshire are neighbouring New England states, the contrast between them is particularly striking. Vermont has the highest tax burden of any state in the union, while New Hampshire has the second lowest - beaten only by Alaska. Yet New Hampshire has the best performance of any state in the union on our index of health and social problems and is closely followed by Vermont, which is third best. They both also do well on equality: despite their radically different taxation, they are the fourth and sixth most equal states respectively.
Both states are ethnically quite homogeneous with much lower proportions of minorities (http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/33000.html) than the American average. Sweden and Japan are similar. There is an argument that social spending is seen as more "acceptable" when the recipients are "people like us". An alternative explanation is that ethnic minorities are unfairly excluded from economic opportunities by the majority population so that higher social ills may be associated with more diverse (less monocultural) populations.
A broader issue, to which Wilkinson and Pickett allude, is whether there is a "natural" level of inequality. Anyone who has studied history (or read Austen and Dickens) will note the vast gulf in wealth between the medieval aristocracy and the peasants or between the early industrialists and their workers. In that light, the period of the "Great compression" from the 1940s to the 1970s, when inequality fell sharply, seems an aberration. But our recorded history only spans a few thousand years, generally since the development of agriculture. For much of human existence, men were hunter-gatherers and such societies are much more equal. Wilkinson and Pickett argue that our brains developed in such conditions, explaining why inequality is so difficult to stomach.
As always with this issue, there will be some who think that any sympathetic treatment of the Wilkinson/Pickett arguments is "socialism" or a sign of The Economist abandoning its free market principles. But let me end this very long post with two final reasons why inequality should be a matter of general concern.
The first concerns the idea that we should focus on "equality of opportunity" not "equality of outcome". This seems a good principle to support. But unequal outcomes may lead to unequal opportunities; the US is a lot less socially mobile than it used to be, and a lot less mobile than individual Americans believe it to be. In particular, wealth can buy access to power and thus lock in the advantages of the wealthy via the political system; Simon Johnson's book, "13 Bankers", is an example of the thesis. Wealth also buys access to the best education, and education is the key to employment opportunities in a service-based economy.
The second issue is that the West is still democratic. Even if one thinks the unequal outcome of incomes is a fair reflection of individual talent and effort, the majority of the population is unlikely to feel that way. They may eventually reclaim that wealth by the ballot box, and possibly by electing some very unpleasant regimes.
Martin Wolf apie Obamą
Nepaprasti laikai reikalauja nepaprastų valdžios veiksmų. Tinka Lietuvai: kaip ne kartą sakiau, reikėjo drąsios daugiabučių renovacijos.
Obama was too cautious in fearful times
By Martin Wolf
Published: August 31 2010 22:48 Last updated: August 31 2010 22:48
Suppose that the US presidential election of 1932 had, in fact, taken place in 1930, at an early stage in the Great Depression. Suppose, too, that Franklin Delano Roosevelt had won then, though not by the landslide of 1932. How different subsequent events might have been. The president might have watched helplessly as output and employment collapsed. The decades of Democratic dominance might not have happened.
On such chances the wheel of history turns. But this time was different: the crisis brought Barack Obama to power close to the beginning of the economic collapse. I (among others) then argued that policy needed to be hugely aggressive. Alas, it was not. I noted on February 4 2009, at the beginning of the new presidency: “Instead of an overwhelming fiscal stimulus, what is emerging is too small, too wasteful and too ill-focused.” A week later, I asked: “Has Barack Obama’s presidency already failed? In normal times, this would be a ludicrous question. But these are not normal times. They are times of great danger. Today, the new US administration can disown responsibility for its inheritance; tomorrow, it will own it. Today, it can offer solutions; tomorrow it will have become the problem. Today, it is in control of events; tomorrow, events will take control of it. Doing too little is now far riskier than doing too much.” This was right.
The direction of policy was not wrong: policymakers – though not all economists – had learnt a great deal from the 1930s. Sensible people knew that aggressive monetary and fiscal expansion was needed, together with reconstruction of the financial sector.
But, as Larry Summers, Mr Obama’s chief economic adviser, had said: “When markets overshoot, policymakers must overshoot too”. Unfortunately, the administration failed to follow his excellent advice. This has allowed opponents to claim that policy has been ineffective when it has merely been inadequate.
In consequence, the administration has lost credibility with the public and the chances of a renewed fiscal expansion have disappeared. With the Federal Reserve cautious, too, the likelihood of a lengthy period of weak growth and heavy joblessness is high. So, too, are the chances of domestic and global political friction.
True, the idea that the policies adopted in the last few months of the Bush administration and the first months of this one were far better than nothing is weirdly controversial in the US. A recent paper by Alan Blinder, former vice-chairman of the Fed, and Mark Zandi of Moody’s argues that such critics are wrong. They use a standard macro-economic model to assess what would have happened without any intervention, without the financial interventions (including monetary policy) and without the fiscal action. They conclude that the peak to trough decline in gross domestic product would have been close to 12 per cent with no policy response, compared to an actual decline of just 4 per cent (see chart). Similarly, the unemployment rate would have peaked at 16.5 per cent, instead of the actual 10 per cent. The bigger collapse would also have meant a fiscal deficit of $2,600bn in fiscal year 2011. The outcome is also disastrous with the modest fiscal response but no financial policy response. It is a little better the other way round.
The implication that the modest stimulus package of February 2009 – a mere 5.7 per cent of 2009 GDP, spread over several years – made a positive contribution is supported by the analysis of the Congressional Budget Office: it argues that in 2010, US GDP will be between 1.5 per cent and 4.1 per cent higher and the unemployment rate between 0.7 and 1.8 percentage points lower, as a result of the package.
Panglossians who believe the private economy is always in equilibrium, unless governments intervene, disagree. I wish there were some way to run this experiment without hurting hundreds of millions of people. But I find the idea that allowing the collapse of much of the financial system, avoiding unconventional monetary policy and struggling to close the fiscal deficit would have been consistent with a more rapid and sustained recovery quite bizarre.
A fascinating perspective does come, however, from comparisons with what happened in other advanced countries. The recession in US output (and so demand) has been relatively small, but the decline in employment has been exceptionally large, as a result of an extraordinary surge in US productivity (see charts). This contrast between what would happen to output and what would happen to employment was missed in the initial Congressional Budget Office analysis of the stimulus.
Since the US was the epicentre of the financial crisis, the relatively small decline in output is remarkable. Moreover, since fiscal and monetary stimuli bear directly on demand and output, not jobs, this is a policy success. At the same time, the enthusiasm with which US managers laid off workers is also extraordinary. No doubt, some of this is due to the collapse in construction. But some of it must be due to the ease with which US companies can lay off workers and the incentives for managers to maintain profits in a downturn at the expense of jobs.
Debate is emerging on how much of the surge in unemployment is structural. My answer, from European experience, is that one way to ensure it becomes structural is to let it linger. In the short run, the simplest way to prevent that from happening is to expand demand and so output. Since there is huge slack in the labour market, not the slightest threat of inflation – far more a risk of deflation – and no constraint from bond or foreign exchange markets on further monetary and fiscal stimulus, these are the policies that have to be pursued. Yet, alas, the Fed seems to have decided to fall asleep and the administration has lost the initiative.
So what is going to happen? I assume that, after the midterm elections, resurgent Republicans will offer new tax cuts and ignore the fiscal deficits. They will pretend that this has nothing to do with any reviled stimulus, though it is much the same thing – increasing fiscal deficits, thereby offsetting private frugality. That would put the administration on the spot. It would have to choose between vetoing the tax cuts and accepting them, so allowing the Republicans to get the credit for their “yacht and mansion-led” recovery. Any recovery is better than none. But it could have been much better than this. Those who were cautious when they should have been bold will pay a big price.
martin.wolf@ft.com
Premjeras Balsiuose
Premjeras, nenorintis įteisinti kaštų ir naudos analizės, rugsėjo pirmąją lankėsi Balsių mokykloje. Simboliška:)
Kontrolierius: vilniečiai už Balsių mokyklą permokės 82 mln. litų
Atnaujinta liepos 21 d. 10.45 val., Ieva Urbonaitė, www.DELFI.lt
2010 liepos mėn. 20 d. 16:28
http://www.delfi.lt/archive/article.php?id=34663617Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės kontrolieriaus Šarūno Skučo skaičiavimais, už pradėtą statyti Balsių mokyklą vilniečiai per 25 metus permokės 82 mln. litų arba ši suma sudarys konkurso laimėtojų viršpelnį. Vilniaus miesto savivaldybės specialistų teigimu, mokyklos statybos ir priežiūros kaina yra optimali, o skaičiavimai, kuriuos pateikia kontrolierius - spekuliatyvūs ir tendencingai interpretuojami.
Pagrįsdamas savo teiginį, kontrolierius pateikė skaičiavimus. Š. Skučo duomenimis, UAB „Merko statyba“ ir E.L.L. Kinnisvara AS konsorciumas savivaldybei pasiūlė daugiau nei 8 mln. litų mokyklos statybos kainą, pabrėždamas, jog minėta suma turi būti mokama kiekvienais metais, 25 metus, todėl visa mokyklos kaina viršys 202,3 mln. litų.
„Į šią sumą įeina ne vien statybų kaina, bet ir viso gerbūvio, mokymo priemonių, komunalinių paslaugų ir kt. išlaidos. Tarp jų daugiau nei 3,7 mln. litų be PVM kapitalo (projekto finansavimo) kaštai (beveik 4,532 mln. litų su PVM), tik keista, kad finansavimo kaštams dar turėsime mokėti ir PVM), t.y. šie kaštai sudaro daugiau nei pusę viso projekto kainos“, - pabrėžia kontrolierius.
Pasak jo, minėti beveik 4,532 mln. litų yra procentas nuo tos sumos, kurią įmonė iš karto investuos į statybas bei gerbūvį, ir kuri bus Savivaldybės išmokėta tik vėliau.
Š. Skučo žodžiais, tai kaina, kurią turime sumokėti už tai, kad ne iš savo ar pačios pasiskolintų lėšų Savivaldybė stato šį projektą: konkursą laimėjęs konsorciumas pats pritraukia lėšas mokyklos statybai, o Savivaldybė apmoka jo patiriamas išlaidas dėl šių lėšų pritraukimo ar akcininkų nuosavybės panaudojimo statyboms.
Įspūdingi procentai
„Nuo kitų prekių ar paslaugų suteikimo nereikia skaičiuoti finansavimo kaštų, kadangi šios išlaidos patiriamos ne iš karto, o kiekvienais metais, ir joms sukurti patirti kaštai nėra ilgalaikė investicija. Pagal Sutartį statybos ir įrengimo kaina nurodyta 1 273 893 93 lito be PVM kasmet 25 metus, todėl visa statybos kaina yra 31 847 348,25 lito be PVM, arba 38 535 291,38 lito su PVM. Tokiu būdu finansavimo kaštai sudaro apie 12 nuošimčių nuo investicijų“, - aiškino Š. Skučas, pridurdamas, jog tai dar ne viskas.
Anot savivaldybės kontrolės ir audito tarnybos vadovo, visi žinome, kad kreditorius palūkanas skaičiuoja tik nuo likusio negražinto likučio, kuris sugrąžinus dalį paskolos mažėja.
„Vietoje per 25 metus susidarysiančių 113 mln. litų finansavimo kaštų, bankas paskaičiuotų tik apie 60 mln. litų palūkanų. Tokiu būdu turime jau ne 12 nuošimčių finansavimo kaštus, tačiau pakankamai įspūdingus net ir krizės laikais beveik 23 nuošimčius, - atkreipė dėmesį kontrolierius. - Be abejo, kaip savivaldybei, tai yra tikrai labai daug, nes ji galėtų pasiskolinti tokias lėšas gal būt už 3 proc. metinių palūkanų, t. y. apie 3,4 mln. litų kasmet pigiau, nei turėsime mokėti pagal sutartį“.
Mokykla gali „pakibti ore“
Š. Skučas identifikavo dar vieną pasislėpusią galimą problemą: kas bus, jei konsorciumo dalyviai įkeis mokyklą, pasiskolins jos statybai pinigų, o per 25 metų laikotarpį nespės padengti paskolos ir mokykla liks įkeista?
Pasak jo, remiantis sutartimi, gali būti įkeistas tiek sklypas, tiek mokykla, tiek turto nuosavybės teisę turinčios įmonės akcijos, tiek ir visi būsimi mokėjimai pagal šią sutartį.
„Jei susidarys minėta situacija, visa mokykla „pakibs ore“, Savivaldybė negalės perimti teisių į ją, o kreditoriai reikalaus arba Savivaldybei padengti trūkstamą paskolos dalį, arba mokykla turėtų būti parduodama. Bet tai tik teorinė galimybė, jei konsorciumo dalyviai piktybiškai nevykdytų įsipareigojimų kreditoriui, arba jei nebeturėtų tam finansinių galimybių“, - sakė kontrolierius.
Racionaliau nuomoti
Pastato naudotojai (nuomininkai) nesuka galvos, iš kokių pinigų pastato savininkas jį pastatė bei įrengė, ir kokia tų pinigų kaina. Nuomininką domina tik jo kas mėnesį sumokamos nuomos kaina.
Š. Skučo nuomone, tai galėtų būti analogas ir Balsių mokyklos projekto atvejui. Mokyklą galėtų statyti privatūs verslininkai iš nuosavų lėšų, o Savivaldybė ją nuomotųsi.
„Tarkime mokykla sudarytų 10 000 kvadratinių metrų, o vieno nuomos kaina sudarytų 30 litų per mėnesį su PVM. Tokiu būdu mokykla miestui kainuotų 3,6 mln. litų per metus, dar papildomai tektų pirktis aptarnavimo paslaugas bei susimokėti komunalinius mokesčius. Ir viskas. Dabar gi statytojai nurodo ūkio priežiūros ir administravimo išlaidas 999 986,70 lito be PVM, arba apie 1,2 mln. litų su PVM. Taigi nuomos atveju, metinė mokyklos pastato naudojimo kaina Savivaldybei sudarytų kaip nuomos mokesčio bei ūkio priežiūros ir administravimo sąnaudų suma, o būtent viso labo tik apie 4,8 mln. litų vietoj dabartinių beveik 8,1 mln. Litų“, - skaičiavo kontrolierius.
Pigesnių variantų nerado
Apie vilniečiams brangiai kainuosiantį projektą prabilęs kontrolierius priminė, jog šiandieninėje situacijoje Savivaldybė skolintis Balsių mokyklos statybai negali, o konkurso laimėtojas pasiūlė mažiausią kaina.„Todėl ko gera kitų pasirinkimų Savivaldybės taryba ir neturėjo, kaip tik dabartinį priimtą sprendimą, tačiau tokia situacija padiktavo tai, kad mes visi turėsime susimokėti minėtą apie 82 mln. litų „baudą“, - konstatavo Š.Skučas.
Paviešindamas abejones kontrolierius pabrėžė, kad jo kritika nėra skirta Vilniaus miesto tarybos sprendimui pasirašyti Balsių mokyklos statybos, ūkio priežiūros ir administravimo sutartį, nes „ši mokykla turbūt yra būtina, o viešojo pirkimo laimėtojas atrinktas kaip pasiūlęs mažiausią kainą, todėl pigesnių alternatyvų Savivaldybė ko gera šiuo metu ir neturėjo“.
V. Navickas: pasirinktas racionaliausias sprendimas
DELFI komentuodamas kontrolieriaus skaičiavimus, Vilniaus meras Vilius Navickas priminė, jog Balsių mokyklos statybos vietos bendruomenė laukia daugiau nei 10 metų.
Savivaldybės vadovo nuomone, miesto taryba priėmė racionaliausią sprendimą, nes mokyklai nuomojant jau pastatytas patalpas 1 kvadratinis metras kainuotų ne 30 litų, o dvigubai daugiau, nes dar 30 litų tektų mokėti už kiekvieno kvadratinio metro įrangą ir šildymą. Tai, V. Navicko teigimu, per didelė kaina.
Bankai nepanoro dalytis rizika
„Į Balsių mokyklos kainą – apie 50 Lt per mėnesį už kvadratinį metrą – įskaičiuotos visos įmanomos mokyklos statybos ir priežiūros išlaidos: pastato ir aplinkos pilnas įrengimas ir priežiūros darbai visą sutarties laikotarpį, baldai ir kitas ugdymui būtinas inventorius, bibliotekos, valgyklos įrengimas, sporto ir poilsio erdvių statyba, visi komunaliniai mokesčiai, apsauga, draudimas ir kiti kaštai. Savivaldybė bus atsakinga tik už ugdymo organizavimą“, - sakė Savivaldybės Investicinių projektų skyriaus vedėja Rasa Cibulskienė.
Specialistės teigimu, su konkurso laimėtoju suderėta kaina nėra maža, nes bankai ar kitos kredito institucijos nepanoro su investuotojais dalintis rizika, o projekto finansavimui bus panaudotos UAB „Merko statyba“ kompanijos lėšos.
Balsių mokykla bus pirmoji Lietuvoje švietimo įstaiga, pastatyta pagal viešojo ir privataus sektoriaus bendradarbiavimo principus, ir pirmoji nuo nepriklausomybės atkūrimo Vilniuje pastatyta nauja mokykla.
Pasak savivaldybės, lyginant šio konkurso metu gautus pasiūlymus su pasiūlymais, gautais 2008 metais, projekto kaina sumažėjo per pusę.
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